皇冠体育app

On 26 April 2008 at approximately 06:30 hrs an engineers鈥� train involved in track renewal work struck the rear of a similar, stationary train at approximately 15 mph (22 km/h) whilst being positioned within the engineering possession for the work. Two wagons were severely damaged, and a locomotive sustained minor damage. 皇冠体育appre were no casualties.

皇冠体育app immediate cause of the collision was that the train driver did not limit his speed in accordance with the engineering supervisor鈥檚 instructions.

This was because:

• 皇冠体育app driver did not recognise he was within a work site, and did not control the speed of the train as instructed (and as laid down in the rule book)
• 皇冠体育appre is no procedure to maintain a written record of an engineering supervisor鈥檚 instructions about the movement of trains in a work site. 皇冠体育app lack of this discipline meant that the engineering supervisor did not realise that the driver had not absorbed his instructions
• 皇冠体育app driver was in a state of fatigue, which he did not report to his control
• 皇冠体育app engineering supervisor did not know the exact location of the trains within the work site, and hence his instructions to the driver were not specific
• Other staff in the locomotive cab did not challenge the driver鈥檚 excessive speed.

As a consequence of this accident, RAIB has made seven recommendations targeted at Network Rail, Balfour Beatty and the Rail Standards and Safety Board. 皇冠体育appse relate to the planning, risk assessment and use of engineering trains within work sites and the means of communication about the movement of such trains.

Response to recommendations:

• RAIB will periodically update the status of recommendations as reported to us by the relevant safety authority or public body
• RAIB may add comment, particularly if we have concerns regarding these responses.