皇冠体育app

Summary

At around 06:05 on 22 March 2024, a passenger train travelling at 56 mph (90 km/h) derailed on the approach to Grange-over-Sands station. 皇冠体育app derailment occurred because a void had opened in the embankment on which the train was travelling, leading to the rails under the train losing support. 皇冠体育app train was carrying four train crew and four passengers when it derailed. Nobody was injured, but significant damage was caused to both the train and the railway infrastructure.

RAIB鈥檚 investigation found that the void had been created because water had dislodged embankment material and carried it away. 皇冠体育app water came from a pipe partially buried beneath the railway, which had been damaged during routine maintenance around 2 days before the derailment.

皇冠体育app damage to the pipe had been reported immediately to the railway control room by the maintenance staff involved. However, as a result of ineffective communications, no action was taken to stop the consequent leak. 皇冠体育app pipe had been installed by Network Rail in 2016 as a temporary measure to assist in managing flood water in the surrounding areas, but on-call engineering staff were unaware that it was in use and carrying water at the time it was damaged.

Underlying factors to the accident were that those responsible for managing flood water at this location had not done so effectively, leading to the prolonged need to rely on temporary pumping arrangements. RAIB also identified that staffing levels at Network Rail鈥檚 Carnforth maintenance delivery unit did not provide sufficient resilience and had allowed non-compliance with the standards relating to the management of tamping to become normalised. In addition, Network Rail had allowed a temporary pumping arrangement to become permanent without applying the relevant asset management procedures.

Recommendations

As a result of its investigation, RAIB has made five recommendations. 皇冠体育app first three recommendations are made to Network Rail. 皇冠体育app first of these aims to reduce the risk associated with temporary drainage solutions which remain in place for longer than anticipated. 皇冠体育app second asks Network Rail to review how it can improve the ability of tamper operators to detect buried services. 皇冠体育app third aims to reduce the likelihood that buried services are struck during maintenance by ensuring staffing levels are adequate to comply with Network Rail鈥檚 own procedures. 皇冠体育app fourth recommendation is made to the Environment Agency, and other local stakeholders, and aims to encourage timely decision-making in relation to the future of this area so that the management of flood water does not manifest in another risk to the railway. 皇冠体育app final recommendation is addressed to Eversholt Rail Leasing Limited, the owner of the train involved, and aims to reduce the risk of a derailed train being struck by a train on the adjacent line due to a failure of communications and warning systems.

Additionally, RAIB has identified three learning points. 皇冠体育app first of these reminds track workers of the importance of completing required site visits ahead of planned work to mark up obstructions. 皇冠体育app second reminds staff of the importance of being readily contactable when on call, and the final learning point encourages railway controllers to escalate issues where the first line on-call staff are not available.

Response to recommendations:

• RAIB will periodically update the status of recommendations as reported to us by the relevant safety authority or public body
• RAIB may add comment, particularly if we have concerns regarding these responses.