皇冠体育app

Summary

At around 18:53 hrs on Saturday 13 March 2021, a Merseyrail train hit the buffer stop at Kirkby station, Merseyside. 皇冠体育app train was travelling at 41 mph (66 km/h) as it entered the platform. Soon afterwards, the driver applied the emergency brake, but there was insufficient distance remaining to prevent the collision, and the train struck the buffer stop at around 29 mph (47 km/h). 皇冠体育app train came to rest under a bridge, around 28 metres beyond the original buffer stop position. 皇冠体育app driver was taken to hospital as a precaution and was discharged the following day. 皇冠体育appre were no other reported injuries to the guard or to the 12 passengers on board. 皇冠体育app collision caused significant damage to the station infrastructure and the front of the train, with the station remaining closed for eight days.

皇冠体育app accident occurred because the driver of the train did not apply the brakes in time, as he was distracted from the driving task by his mobile phone and by his bag falling onto the cab floor.

No engineered systems automatically applied the train鈥檚 brakes, as the conditions for their intervention were not met. 皇冠体育app driver continued to operate the controls for two of these systems (the automatic warning system and the driver鈥檚 safety device), preventing their activation, despite not being entirely engaged in the driving task. A third system (the train protection and warning system) did not activate until after the driver had already applied the emergency brake. This system was installed in compliance with the relevant standards but it did not protect against the particular scenario of this accident.

皇冠体育app risk assessment processes used by Merseyrail and Network Rail did not identify the risk of the buffer stop being hit at relatively high speed. RAIB also observed that Merseyrail鈥檚 fatigue risk management procedure did not follow current industry good practice.

This accident would almost certainly have had a worse outcome if there had been more passengers on the train or in the platform area behind the buffer stop. At the time, the COVID-19 pandemic had led to restrictions on social contact which resulted in a reduction in passenger numbers.

Recommendations

RAIB has made three recommendations. 皇冠体育app first is addressed to RSSB and relates to research into devices to monitor the alertness and awareness of drivers. 皇冠体育app second, addressed to Merseyrail and Network Rail, seeks to improve the risk assessment process for collisions with buffer stops at terminal platforms. 皇冠体育app final recommendation asks Merseyrail to improve its fatigue management process to follow industry good practice.

RAIB also identified two learning points. 皇冠体育app first reminds train drivers of the risks posed by using a mobile phone while driving a train. 皇冠体育app second reminds train operating companies of the importance of understanding the limits of protection offered by the train protection and warning system when risks assessing terminal platforms.

Response to recommendations:

• RAIB will periodically update the status of recommendations as reported to us by the relevant safety authority or public body
• RAIB may add comment, particularly if we have concerns regarding these responses.