皇冠体育app

Summary

At about 13:03 hrs on 26 September 2023, a member of Great Western Railway (GWR) staff responsible for shunting trains at St Philips Marsh depot, Bristol, was struck by a train that was exiting the depot鈥檚 main shed building. 皇冠体育app train was travelling at 10 mph (16 km/h) at the time of the accident. After hearing the train strike something, the driver applied the brakes and stopped the train. Others working nearby saw that the shunter was lying next to the train and went to help them. 皇冠体育app shunter, who had sustained serious injuries, was treated by paramedics and then taken to hospital.

After exiting the main shed building via a roller shutter door, the shunter had walked into the path of a train which its driver then started to move and accelerate much quicker than the shunter expected. 皇冠体育app shunter took this route to get to a level crossing that ran across the end of the shed building. RAIB found that the shunter did this as they wanted to check that no one was approaching the level crossing from a blind corner. 皇冠体育app shunter regularly used the area between the main shed building and the level crossing as a walking route, so was used to being there. However, by using this route the shunter had to walk close to or foul of the train鈥檚 path. 皇冠体育app shunter was also unaware that the train had started to move and did not realise it was catching up with them. 皇冠体育appy had expected to reach the level crossing before the train, but the train exceeded the speed limit of 5 mph (8 km/h). 皇冠体育app driver did not observe the shunter walking ahead of the train so did not take any appropriate actions in response.

An underlying factor was that GWR had not effectively controlled the risk of a shunter being struck by a train outside of a shed building. Another underlying factor was that GWR鈥檚 assurance processes had not identified that train movements within the depot were exceeding the speed limit.

Following the accident, GWR updated its risk assessment and introduced new control measures to specifically manage the risks to staff associated with trains moving outside the main shed building. GWR also addressed the deficiencies found with its assurance processes for monitoring if drivers were complying with the speed limits on its depots.

Recommendations

As a result of the investigation, RAIB has made two recommendations. Both are addressed to GWR. 皇冠体育app first is to review the personal track safety training and assessment it provides for shunters, so that they receive an appropriate level of information and assessment about working and walking on depots. 皇冠体育app second is to identify the places on its depots where its staff might be required to walk foul of a train鈥檚 path when using a walking route or walkway, and then manage the risk of its staff being struck by a train in these locations.

RAIB has also identified four learning points. 皇冠体育app first is to remind staff who work and walk on depots and in sidings of the personal track safety requirement to look out for approaching trains at least every 5 seconds when walking on the railway. 皇冠体育app second is to remind drivers of the importance of complying with all speed limits on depots and in sidings. 皇冠体育app third highlights the importance of drivers and shunters coming to a clear understanding about a train movement. 皇冠体育app fourth is for staff who work in safety鈥慶ritical roles to remember to declare to their employer if they have taken any medication that might have the potential to impact on their performance.

Response to recommendations:

• RAIB will periodically update the status of recommendations as reported to us by the relevant safety authority or public body
• RAIB may add comment, particularly if we have concerns regarding these responses.